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Trends in Capital-Output Ratios
THE relationship between capital and output can be investigated by
relating either the change in capital to the associated change in output
(the marginal ratio of capital to output) or the stock of capital existing
in a given period to the total output of the period (average ratio of
capital to output). When output is increasing—which generally has
been the case during these decades—the movement of one ratio can be
inferred from the movement of the other. There is no need, therefore,
to analyze changes in both.1 We use the average ratios.2
Capital-Output Ratios in Reported and Constant Prices,
All Manufacturing (1880—1953) and Mining (1870—1953)
In all manufacturing industries the amount of capital invested per
dollar of output rose steadily from 1880 through 1914 (see Chart 4 and
Table 11; capital is measured in book values and output in current
prices, magnitudes that owe little to our statistical processing). The
amount of capital invested per output dollar began to fall after 1914
and continued to do so through 1948. The capital-output ratio for
1919 was sharply below the peak ratio because the inflation of output
prices greatly exceeded the inflation of capital in book values. Simi-
larly, the inflation of post-World War II caused a sharp drop in the
ratios between 1937 and 1948. Contributory factors were the unusually
high rate of capacity utilization and the inability of management to
expand capacity to desired levels because of continued shortages. The
substantial expansion in capital between 1948 and 1953 eliminated
many of the bottlenecks of the early postwar years and exceeded the
sharp rise in output. As a result, the 1953 capital-output ratio, without
adjustment for price changes, exceeded that for 1948 by nearly 7 per
cent.
The 1937 ratio is of critical importance in establishing the down-
ward trend. Although business activity in 1937 was at a cyclical peak,
the rate of capacity utilization in 1937 was less than that in 1929. Were
I It can be shown algebraically that if output increases, a rise in the average ratios
means that the marginal ratio is higher than the larger of the two average ratios
bounding the interval; if output increases, a decline in the average ratios means
that the marginal ratio is lower than the smaller of the two average ratios.It
follows from this that the marginal ratios fluctuate more widely than the average
ratios. These relationships were brought to our attention by Simon Kuznets (see
Introduction, note 5, above).
2 The use of average ratios obviates the problem of dealing with negative changes
in one term of the ratio.
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this the only factor that had changed, then the 1937 ratio would be
higher than the 1929 ratio. Since it is lower, other actors may have
been operative.
Since price changes are incorporated more rapidly into the value of
output than into the book value of capital, they should be eliminated
for a truer perspective. This is most effectively accomplished by de-
flating both output and book values of capital. We express them in
CHART 4
Ratios of Capital to Output and to Value Added,
Selected Valuations,AllManufacturing,Selected
Years, 1880—1953
C/O = capital-output ratio.







1929 prices. Introduction of the Constant price base raises the level of
the ratios for 1919 and 1948 and produces smoother trend movements.
With price changes eliminated (but not revaluations of capital assets),
the capital-output ratio rises through 1919 at a faster rate than the
uncorrected ratio, and declines thereafter (until 1948), again at a faster
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TABLE 11
Ratios of Capital to Output and to Value Added, Selected Valuations,
All Manufacturing, Selected Years, 1880—1953
RaLie Of
Capital
(book value) Capital Capital Capital
, to Output to Output to Output to Value Added
Benchmark (current prices)(1929 prices)(current pricesa)(1929 prices)
rears (1) (2) (3) (4)
1880 0.528 0.547 0.489 1.506
1890 0.679 0.730 0.670 1.651
1900 .
Comparable with
preceding years 0.748 0.803 0.795 1.878
Comparable with
following years 0.743 0.794 0.790 1.882
1904 0.815 0.891 n.a. 2.093
1909 0.851 0.967 0.900 2.309
1914 0.894 1.008 n.a. 2.460
1919 0.688 1.022 0.873 2.555
1929 0.829 0.885 0.867 2.020
1937 0.744 0.741 0.787 1.809
1948 0.532 0.609 0.621 1.550
l953b 0.570 0.590 n.a. n.a.
n.a. =notavailable.
a Capital in current prices is equivalent to replacement costs in the given year.
bIfprivately operated, government-owned facilities are excluded from total capital,
the respective ratios are 0.549 and 0.570 (see Table 26, note b).
Source
Column Appendix Table Remarks
1 A-8 and A-15 1953 output from worksheets
2 A-iS and A-15
3 A-l0 (output only) capital from worksheets (see App. A,
sec. B, part 3 for derivation)
4 A-10
rate than the uncorrected ratio.3 Despite the rapid expansion in real
capital between 1948 and 1953, the ratio decreased by about 3 per cent.
Some might argue that the appropriate denominator of the capital-
output ratio is value added, in order to eliminate interfirm transactions
3 Another way to minimize price distortion is to relate capital in current prices
(i.e., replacement cost) to output in current prices. This procedure reduces the errors
of estimate, because no adjustments are made in the reported value of output.
Significantly, the path traced by the ratios in current prices is very similar to the
one traced by the ratios in constant prices, except for 1919 (Chart 4 and Table 11).
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from the value of product. Since this claim has some merit, we show
(Chart 5) the ratio of capital to value added in manufacturing, both in
constant prices. This ratio, too, traces virtually the same pattern as the
capital-output ratio based on values in constant prices.' However, ratios
based on the indexes of manufacturing output prepared by Frickey
CHART5
Indexes of Ratios of Capital to Output and to
Value Added, All Manufacturing, Selected Years,
1880—1948
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Source: Appendix Tables A-8 and A-b.
andFabricant show a definite reversal in direction beginning in 1909
instead of 1919.
Onthe basis of this evidence, we can say that manufacturing has
developed along the following course: In the earlier decades, an in-
creasing fraction of a dollar of capital was used to produce a dollar of
output; in more recent decades, a decreasing fraction of a dollar of
capital has been sufficient to produce a dollar of output. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation that, in the earlier decades, capital
4Inmining, also, the trend movements are similar whether the denominator is
value of product or value added (Table 36, below).
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innovations on balance probably served more to replace other factor
inputs than to increase output. More recently, the balance has been in
the other direction—capital innovations serve more to increase the
CHART6
Capital-Output Ratios, by Major Mining Industries, Selected Years,
1870—1953
efficiency of capital and hence, to increase output, rather than to re-
place other factor inputs.
Trend movements in the capital-output ratio were much the same
in mining as in manufacturing. The general configuration of the trend
movements is similar whether the ratios are based on reported values
or on values in 1929 prices (Chart 6 and Table 12). However, the ratio
See Chapter II, note 9
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Reported values
Values in 1929 prices
Per cent Per cent
Source: Based on Table 23.CAPiTAL-OUTPUT RATiOS
based on deflated values reached a peak around 1919. It has continued
downward through 1953, the final year of our estimates. On the other
hand, the ratios based on reported values have a steeper rise, a sharper
decline, and a hollow in 1919. The reason for these differences is that
1870, 1919, and 1940—1948 were years of war or postwar inflation, when
price increases were incorporated into the market value of the product
TABLE 12















Source: Appendix Tables B-7 to B-Il.
more promptly than into the book value of capital. Thus, the ratios
based on reported values are too low in those years. The capital-output
ratios, especially the plant°-output ratios, based on reported values are
useful chiefly as a check on the results of the adjustment for the varia-
tion in price levels. Their only virtue is that they are based on figures
obtained by less statistical processing than those based on values in
1929 prices.
Effect ofData Deficiencieson Trend
The apparent reversal in the trend of the capital-output ratio is our
cardinal finding, and itis important, therefore, that its empirical
validity be above challenge. For this reason, we consider the probable
impact on this finding of some of the deficiencies in the data and in
our procedures.
The reversal in trend cannot be attributed to the adjustment for
price changes because the reversal also appears in the ratios based on
6Netvalue of structures and equipment.
43CAPITAL AXD OUTPUT TREXDS
reported values. Moreover, the adjustment for price changes alters the
ratios in the direction demanded by logic.
If the downward movement in the ratios between 1919 and 1929 is
suspect because of the shift in the source of our data—from the Census
of Manufactures to Statistics of Income—we point to the continued
decline in the ratios between 1929 and 1948, when all the ratios are
based on data from Statistics of Income.
While the precise impact of the shift in the treatment of deprecia-
tion on the trend in capital-output ratios is difficult to assess because
of serious gaps in our information, some important conclusions can be
made with certainty. For example, beginning with 1919, no significant
changes have taken place in the treatment of depreciation. Therefore,
the fall in the capital-output ratios after 1919 cannot be due to changes
in the treatment of depreciation.7
What of the rising trend in the ratios between 1880 and 1909? There
is no reason for believing that any important shift in the practice of
depreciation accounting occurred before the inception of the corporate
income tax, i.e., before 1909. Whatever bias stems from the situation,
however, minimizes the rise in the capital-output ratio and thus
strengthens our finding. If, as we believe, capital was increasingly re-
ported on a net basis, as formal depreciation accounting became more
widespread, then the rise in the capital-output ratio is understated.
Between 1909 and 1914, this understatement should be especially pro-
nounced because of the widespread acceptance of depreciation account-
ing following the introduction of the corporate income tax. If capital
expenditures treated as operating expenditures were excluded from
the reported figures on invested capital in 1909 and earlier years, the
level of the capital-output ratios in those years would be lower than
the "true" level. The trend of the ratios before 1909 would not be
affected unless there was a trend in the percentage of these expenditures
to the stock of capital. Since the important changes in capital account-
ing in manufacturing occurred after 1909, we conclude that there
probably was no strong trend in this direction and that the estimates
of capital-output ratios are, consequently, understated.
Can the rise in the ratios for manufacturing between 1900 and .1904
be attributed to the inflation of capital assets resulting from the
mergers of that period? Undoubtedly, part of the rise can be traced to
this development. Mergers were most important in iron and steel and
their products, and in tobacco products, and these were the only
industries in which the rise from 1900 to 1904 in the capital-output
ratios based on reported values was spectacularly large (39 per cent for
7Forthe effect of another aspect of depreciation during recent decades, see p. 46.
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iron and steel and their products and 133 per cent for tobacco).8 How-
ever, even if we exclude these two major groups from the computation,
the capital-output ratio for 1904 is still 4 per cent higher than the 1900
ratio, and for 1909 the ratio is 10 per cent above 1900. With these two
major groups included, the percentage increases were 10 and 15. This
suggests that not all of the rise between 1900 and 1904 or 1909 can be
explained by promoters' revaluation of the assets of industrial com-
binations.
Thus, the rising trend in the ratios between 1870 or 1880 and 1909—
1919 is no accounting mirage, and the declining trend after 1919 can-
not be attributed merely to the shift in depreciation practices.
Statistics of Income for 1929 and later years includes intangible assets
such as patent rights and good will. Exclusion of these intangible assets
in the earlier years raises the level of the ratios for 1929 and after but
does not affect the direction of movement. Our finding of a decline in
the capital-output ratios for this period is not, therefore, affected by
the slight shift in the definition of capital.
The ratios for 1929, 1937, 1948, and 1953 are based on balance sheet
data of corporations only. The ratios for earlier years are based on
data for all firms, incorporated and unincorporated alike.9 However,
unincorporated firms have smaller assets per firm than the average
corporation, and the smaller the firm, the smaller the capital-output
ratio. Therefore, the lack of comparability adds to the firmness of our
results.
And this is also the effect on the 1948 ratio of our treatment of the
wartime emergency facilities subject to accelerated amortization.1° We
assume that these facilities are subject only to normal depreciation;
but because of the specialized character of some of them, the rate of
obsolescence must have been above average. Thus, the 1948 estimate of
capital is overstated by a small amount; and on this score, too, the
"true" capital-output ratio would be slightly lower than our estimate.
8Therelative importance of mergers in major industry groups is measured by
relating the cumulative authorized capital stock by major groups as reported by
Myron W. Watkins (Industrial Combinations and Public Policy [Houghton Muffin,
1927], Appendix II) to the 1905 Census of Manufactures figure on capital by major
groups. In iron and steel and their products, authorized capital stock was 98 per
cent of census capital in 1904, and in tobacco products 128 per cent. For all other
industries, authorized capital stock amounted to one-third of capital reported in
the 1905 census.
Unincorporated firms accounted for 8.5 per cent of value added in manufacturing
in 1929 and For 8.1 per cent in 1947 (see Census of Manufactures for these years).
In mining, the unincorporated firms accounted for 9 per cent of total value of
output in 1939 (see Census of Mining, 1939).
10Inmining, the value of wartime emergency facilities subject to accelerated
amortization was negligible. At its peak in 1943, accelerated amortization amounted
to only 5 per cent of normal depreciation.
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Depreciation accounting since 1929 becloucls our view of the secular
movement of capital. Some argue, for example;'that statutory deprecia-
tion charges in manufacturing are too high (1ezigth-of-1ife estimates are
too low). Consequently, net capital is understated, and the understate-
ment becomes progressively larger as the stock of capital expands.
Could this understatement cause the capital-output ratio to decline
after 1929? This possibility could be explored in the following way. In
each benchmark year, we would add the amount of the understatement
of the stock of capital to the reported values. We would then compute
the capital-output ratios. However, we cannot estimate the true amount
of the understatement, and we are obliged to assume varying amounts
of understatement. We start with the extreme assumption that there is
no capital consumption and that the understatement is equal to the
entire depreciation reserve. The resultant ratios of gross total capital
to output (both in constant prices) are 1.199, 0.998, and 0.856 for 1929,
1937, and 1948, respectively. The downward trend is clear and sub-
stantial, and it would be pointless to experiment with smaller amounts
of understatement of net capital. Therefore, the downward trend of
the ratios based on capital net of depreciation cannot be attributed to
a progressive understatement of the net capital accounts.
Our appraisal of the statistical materials we are obliged to use is
reassuring. It fails to disclose any weakness large enough to shake our
confidence in the validity of the trend in the capital-output ratios,
particularly when our interest in centered on the broad pattern of
movement.
Effect of Changes in the Composition of Manufacturing Industries
Thus far, we have presented ratios based on aggregative data—fixed
and working capital combined, all industries, and all firms regardless
of size. Could the reversal in the trend of the ratios have been caused
by the shifting importance of the components of the aggregates?
Fortunately, we have sufficient evidence to give definitive answers on
the effects of changes in the type of assets and of interindustry
differences in growth.
A casual inspection of the deflated capital-output ratios (in per-
centages) by minor industries for 1880 (Appendix Table A-13) is
sufficientto indicate their wide range—from 8.5(packing house
products) and 25.7 (boots and shoes) at the lower end, to 207.8 (agri-
cultural machinery and equipment) and 211.4 (chemicals proper, acids,
compounds, etc.) at the upper end. We can infer from Table 6 that
the various industries have grown at different rates. Thus, the possi-
bility exists that industries with relatively high capital-output ratios in
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1880 expanded more rapidly until 1919 than those with relatively low
ratios and, thus, caused the ratio for all manufacturing to rise. Simi-
larly, after 1919, did industries with relatively low ratios become more
important than those with high ratios, and so cause the ratio for all
manufacturing to decline?
Price Adjustments and Their Effect
Before we investigate the foregoing problems, we must consider
whether our method of deflating the book value of capital would in
itself impose a common pattern of change on the ratios of the minor
industries. Our method was to derive a set of composite indexes, one
for each of fifteen major industry groups, from (1) an index of building
costs (identical for all industries) based on a fifty-year life; (2) an index
of prices of machinery and equipment differently weighted in each
major group according to the length of life typical of the industry; and
(3) as a deflator of working capital, an index of wholesale prices of the
output of each major industry group. The composite index for a given
major industry was applied to all minor industries classified under the
given major industry.
Chart 7 shows the indexes used for each of the fifteen groups to
adjust book values of capital to 1929 prices. The strong resemblance
among these indexes cannot be denied, and this result is to be expected
in view of the procedure. However, it does not necessarily follow that
these indexes differ by substantial margins from the movements of
indexes based on more complete price data, since producers' prices of
many commodities move in sympathy over the longer term. The move-
ment of the implicit price indexes used to express output in 1929
prices also supports this view (Chart 8). Here, also, the individual
indexes, except for rubber products, show only small deviations from
a common pattern, despite the fact that each group index is based on
wholesale price quotations for a different roster of commodities.
In Chart 9 we show, for each major industry, two sets of capital-
output ratios, one based on reported values and one on 1929 prices.
As a result of the price adjustments, the 1919 and 1948 ratios have
been raised. These ratios are "too low" when based on reported values
because, in both years, the culmination of rapid price rises affected the
value of output more than it did the book value of capital.
Only in 2 of the 15 groups, rubber products, and petroleum refining,
is it probable that the price adjustments have seriously distorted the
movements of the ratio before 1929. It is important to note that the
reversal in direction of the capital-output ratios exists in the unad-
justed ratios, and the price adjustment has the effect, in many cases, of
dating the peak at 1919 rather than at an earlier benchmark year.
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Major Manufacturing Industries: Price Indexes (Book Value) of Total










Source: Appendix Table A-Il.
Note: Data for iron and steel and their products and nonferrous metals and their
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Major Manufacturing Industries: Capital-Output Ratios, Selected Years,
1880—1953
Reported values
Voues in 1929 prices
Ratio scales




Values in 1929 prices
Per cent
Source: 1880—1948: for ratios based on values in 1929 prices, see Appendix Table A-13;
ratios based on reported prices are derived from data in Appendix Tables A-8 and A-lO;
1953: based on Appendix Table A-15.
Note: Data for iron and steel arid their products and nonferrous metals and their
products are not available separately in 1953.
Ratiosin Constant Prices, by Minor industries, 1880—1948
The ratios for the major industry groupings are, in effect, averages
of the ratios of the minor industries comprising the major groupings.
In Appendix Table A-13, we present the capital-output ratios based
on values in 1929 prices for 39 minor industries for all benchmark
years.'1 At this point, we merely indicate the distribution of the peak
ratios according to the year of occurrence, disregarding peak ratios that
occurred in 1904 and 1914, years of business contraction.
11Capital-outputratios for 1953werecomputed only for major industry groups,
sincedata were not available forthe minor groups at the time of writing.
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Year in Which Peak Capital-Output Ratio Occurred
18801890190019091919192919371948
No. of minor
industries 0 3 4 6 18 7 1 0
In 31 industries (about four-fifths), the highest ratios occurred before
1929, and in nearly half, the peak ratio was reached in 1919. Our
earlier generalization has been borne out by the more detailed in-
formation. It follows, by definition, that the 1929 ratio is lower than
the 1919 ratio in the 31 industries that had peak ratios before 1929.
More significantly, in all except 3 of the 39 industries, the 1937 ratios
were lower than the 1929 ratios, and in all except 4 of the 39 industries,
they were lower than the 1919 ratios.
Trends in the Ratios of industries Classified by Ultimate
Use of Output
The reversal in trend of the capital-output ratios appears also when
the minor industries are grouped according to the ultimate use of the
product__consumption goods, construction materials, capital equip-
ment, and producers' supplies. Industries in the last three categories
TABLE 13
Capital-Output Ratios: Manufacturing Industries Classified by Use of Product,
Selected Years, 1880—1948
(based on values in 1929 prices)
Benchmark
Capitai-Output Ratios inIndustries Producing—
Consumption Construction Capital Producers'
rears Goods Materials Equipment Supplies
1880 0.467 0.570 0.868 1.357
1890 0.619 0.773 1.059 1.655
. 1900
Comparable with
preceding years 0.681 0.944 1.052 1.691
Comparable with
following years 0.692 0.801 1.055 1.695
1909 0.794 1.198 1.267 L607
1919 0.860 1.329 1.218 1.695
1929 0.775 1.410 0.921 1.282
1937 0.614 1.109 0.929 1.071
1948 0.522 0.739 0.653 0.796
Source: Based on data in Appendix Tables A-8 and A- 10. The computation was not
extended to 1953 because data for minor industries were not available when this record
was prepared.
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produce commodities that enter into the stock of manufacturing
capital.'2
The peak ratio for industries producing capital equipment was
reached in 1909, and in 1919 for industries turning out producers'
supplies which form part of unfinished inventories (Table 13). The
ratios for production of construction materials reached the peak in
1929, as did those for lumber and basic timber products, an industry
with heavy weight in construction materials output. Thus, in all the
industries contributing to the stock of reproducible wealth of the pro-
ducer goods industries, the "real" capital cost per unit of output first
increased up to 1909 or 1929 and then decreased. The same trends
appear in the consumption goods industries. The capital-output ratio
increased until 1919 and then began to decline.
A Measure of the Effect of Changing Composition
The following computations measure the effects of the changing
composition of manufacturing on the capital-output ratio for aggregate
manufacturing (Table 14). They, too, suggest the general pattern of a
rising capital-output ratio followed by a declining one. The effects can
be indicated both for the rising and the declining phases. For the
rising phase, we compare the average capital-output ratio in 1880 with
the average of the 1880 ratios for each of thirty-eight minor industries
weighted by 1919 outputs, the year in which peak ratios occurred in
roughly half of the industries. The actual average ratio for 1880 is
0.547; the hypothetical average ratio of the 1880 ratios weighted by
1919 outputs is 0.629; and the actual average ratio in 1919 is 1.022.
Thus, the ratio for all manufacturing increased by 87 per cent between
1880 and 1919, whereas the hypothetical average for 1919, which
allows only for the changed importance of industries, increased by
15 per cent over the 1880 ratio. Thus, about one-sixth of the rise be-
tween 1880 and 1919 can be attributed to the altered composition of
the manufacturing total. In other words, throughout the structure of
manufacturing industries, basic changes occurred in the relationship
of capital to output during 1880—1919.
However, output and, to a lesser extent, capital investment in 1919
were distorted by the war and postwar inflation. The inflation also
causes additional difficulties in obtaining values in constant prices.
The use of 1919 output weights, therefore, might yield fortuitous
results. Accordingly, we weight the 1880 ratio by 1909 output, instead
12Thegrouping of industries is based on the classifications prepared by Charles
A. Bliss, The Structure of Manufacturing Production (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1939, Appendix i,pp.141—166).
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TABLE 14
Capital-Output Ratios: Effect of Changes in Internal Composition of Industries,
All Manufacturing, Selected Years, 1880—1937








e. 1880 ratios weighted by 1909 outputs (38 minor industries) 0.608
f.1880 ratios weighted by 1919 outputs (38 minor industries) 0.629
g. 1909 ratios weighted by 1937 outputs (39 minor industries) 1.098
h. 1919 ratios weighted by 1937 outputs (41 minor industries) 1.096
B
Changebetween: 100 x linePer cent
i.1880 actual ratio and 1880 weighted by 1909 outputs +11.2
j.1880 actual ratio and 1909 actual ratio +76.8
k. Relative importance of change in internal compositioni÷j + 14.6
1.1880 actual ratio and 1880 weighted by 1919 outputs L-! +15.0
m. 1880 actual ratio and 1919 actual ratio +868
a. Relative importance of change in internal composition 1÷ m + 17.3
o. 1909 actual ratio and 1909 weighted by 1937 outputs-? +13.0
p. 1909 actual ratio and 1937 actual ratio —22.3
q. 1919 actual ratio and 1919 weighted by 1937 outputs + 7.2
r. 1919 actual ratio and 1937 actual ratio — —26.1
c
a Output figures for 1937 were not adjusted for net physical change in inventories.
Source: Based on Appendix Tables A-l0 and A-13. The computation was not extended
to 1953 because data for minor industries were not available when these estimates were
prepared.
of 1919 output. The hypothetical average ratio for 1909 is 0.608, com-
pared with the actual average ratios of 0.967 in 1909 and 0.547 in 1880.
That is, of the 77 per cent rise in ratios between 1880 and 1909, only
about a seventh is explained by the changing composition of manu-
facturing industries. Thus, whether the comparison is with 1909. or
with 1919, the inference is the same. Throughout manufacturing in-
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dustries, important alterations took place in the relation between
capital and output.
Similar computations -were made for the years after 1909 and 1919,
when the capital-output ratio for all manufacturing industries was
declining. We weight ratios in 1909 and those in 1919 by 1937 output.'3
We then compare the respective hypothetical averages with the actual
averages in 1909, 1919, and 1937. The actual ratio for all manu-
facturing industries fell by 26 per cent between 1919 and 1937. If,
however, we assume that individual industry ratios in 1937 were
identical with those in 1919, but accept whatever shifts have occurred
in the relative importance of the individual industries, the ratio for
aggregate manufacturing for 1937 would have increased by 7 per cent
over the 1919 ratio. In other words, the decline in the actual ratios
occurred despite the changing composition of industry. When 1909
ratios are used in place of those for 1919, similar results are obtained.
Again, the inference is clear for the period of declining ratios: it is a
trend that has characterized most minor industry groups.
Effect of Changes in the Composition of Mining Industries
The rates of growth of individual mining industries differ (Tables
10 and 15). It follows that changes in the capital-output ratio of all
mining are not determined solely by changes in capital-output ratios
within individual industries. As in manufacturing, we must investigate
the effects of shifts in the relative importance of the individual in-
dustries on the movement of the aggregate capital-output ratio. Before
doing so, however, we must examine the changing importance, since
1870, of the various mining industries as producers and as fields of
investment. We must also know about the stability of interindustry
differences in the amount of capital used per unit of output.
In 1870,the beginning of the period studied, anthracite and
bituminous coal mining were the most important industries. Together
they accounted for about 50 per cent Of total capital and total output
of all mining industries (Table 15). During the next decade, however,
the precious metals industry, particularly gold mining, began to dis-
place coal as the principal capital user.1' In both 1880 and 1890,
precious metals mining accounted for more than 40 per cent of all
mining capital. (However, its share of output was considerably less.
Throughout the entire period, its share of capital was larger than its
13Weuse 1937 output in place of 1948 for the same reasons that prompted us to
substitute 1909 output for 1919.
14Thecensus data for precious metals mining are seriously understated in 1870.
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share of output.) The "gold period" came to an end in the 1890's.
Thereafter, its relative decline was so pronounced that precious metals
mining, once the largest, became one of the smaller mining industries.
In 1919, it accounted for only 4 per cent of total mining capital and
only 2 per cent of total mining output.
The period of relative decline in the precious metals industry coin-
cides with that of relative increase in oil and gas production. The share
of the oil and gas industry in total capital rose gradually from about
12 per cent in 1890 to about 21 per cent in 1909. Thereafter, the in-
crease averaged more than 1 percentage point per year. The rise of its
share in mining output was equally impressive. By 1948, the oil and
gas industry accounted for about 68 per cent of the total capital in-
TABLE 16
Capital-Output Ratios in Mining: Major and Minor Industries,
Averages for Selected Groups of Years, 1870—1947
1870, 1880 1909 and 1937a




All mining 2.05 2.50 1.55
Metals 2.87 3.40 1.79
Iron 1.86 2.52 1.03k
Copper 2.63 3.59 1.l2
Lead and zinc 1.79 2.38 0.58a
Precious metals 3.39 5.26 3.09
Anthracite coal 1.72 1.43 1.28
Bituminous coal 1.56 2.03 1.15
Petroleum and natural gas 1.66 3.29 1.79
Other nonmetals 1.23 1.94 1.32
BASED ON VALUES IN 1929 PRICES
(excluding land)
All mining 1.08 2.05 1.33
Metals 2.11 2.33 1.17
Iron 1.15 2.08 n.a.
Copper 1.11 1.97 n.a.
Lead and zinc 0.75 1.38 n.a.
Precious metals 3.70 4.40 n.a.
Anthracite coal 0.51 0.52 0.56
Bituminous coal 0.77 1.15 0.87
Petroleum and natural gas 2.53 5.46 1.90
Other nonrnetals n.a. 1.24 0.78
n.a. =notavailable.
a 1947 only.
Source: Based on Appendix Tables B-7 through B-I I, and worksheets.
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vested in mining and for about 53 per cent of its production. The
percentage of total capital is significantly understated because it does
not include the value of leased land; the overwhelming majority of
mineral lands in operation are leased.15 Like precious metals mining,
oil and gas production accounted for a greater share of capital than of
output throughout most of the period.
Other industries use considerably less capital per unit of output
(Table 16). The relative importance of coal output was much greater
than that of capital during the whole period (except in 1870, when
TABLE 17
Capital-Output Ratios in Mining: Actual and Hypothetical, and Ratio of Actual
to Hypothetical Capital, Selected Years, 1870—1948
(based on values in 1929 prices)
18701880189019091919192919371948
Capital-output ratios:




1890 1.09 1.36 1.36 1.55 1.752.262.532.65
1919 1.22 1.57 1.61 1.892.303.133.583.83
1948 0.680.780.800.90 1.00 1.18 1.281.34
Ratio of actual to hypo-
thetical
1890 0.660.85 1.00 1.16 1.310.950.540.51
1919 0.590.740.850.95 1.000.690.380.35
1948 1.05 1.47 1.701.992.30 1.82 1.06 1.00
Source: Based on Appendix Tables B-8 and B-l I, and worksheets.
coal was the leading field for mining investment). FrOm 1880 to 1919,
the coal mining industry was the most important contributor to the
value of total mining production; its share was about 47 per cent in
1919, while its share of capital in that year was only about 33 per cent.
(During the twenties, the petroleum and gas industry became the
leader in share of output.) The other nonmctals group also uses less
capital per unit of output. The iron, copper, and lead and zinc
industries are intermediate.
What has been the impact of these shifts on aggregate capital used
in mining? Has the observed increase and subsequent decline in the
aggregate capital.output ratio occurred despite the interindustry shifts? 'Thisexplains why the percentages excluding land run considerably higher than
those including land.
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To provide an answer (Table 17), we use the same procedure as in
manufacturing. We assume, first, that the capital-output ratios of the
major industries remain at the 1890 level in all years. To estimate the
hypothetical capital for each of these industries in all other years, we
multiply this constant ratio by actual output in the year. The sum of
these hypothetical capital figures for the major industries, divided by
the sum of their actual value of output in the given year, gives a hypo-
thetical aggregate ratio. This hypothetical ratio is then compared with
the actual aggregate ratio. The hypothetical capital figure represents
the amount of capital that would have been invested in all mining
industries in the benchmark years if the capital-output ratios within
the industries had remained at the 1890 level. Since the interindustry
differences in the ratios have changed, we repeat the computations
using the industry ratios for 1919 and for 1948.
Had industry shifts been the only influence, the aggregate mining
ratio would have increased continuously during the whole pçriod. The
increase would have occurred whether the interindustry differences in
the capital-output ratios had been as they were in 1890, in 1919, or in
1948, and despite the shrinkage of precious metals mining, with its
high capital-output ratio. Thus, the actual increase in the aggregate
ratio between 1870 and 1919 was, in part, a result of the shifts in
industry weights. However, the ratio has declined since 1919 despite
these shifts. Indeed, if the 1919 ratios for each industry had prevailed
in 1948, almost 3 times as much capital would have been used in
mining as actually was used in that year. This means that capital
would have risen to about 3.9 times the 1919 level during those twenty-
nine years compared with a rise in output to more than 2.3 times the
level in 1919. Actually, capital used in 1948 was only 1.4 times that
used in 1919. Even if the relatively low industry ratios of 1890 had
been maintained through 1948, the volume of capital in that year
would have been twice as high as it really was. And, per contra, if the
industry's utilization of capital in the other years had been as low as
it was in 1948, capital in 1919 would have been only about 43 per cent
of the actual amount used in that year and, in 1890, about 57 per cent
of the actual amount.
Size of Firm and the Capital-Output Ratio
The impact of changes in the size structure of industry upon the
capital-output ratio cannot be measured with any reasonable degree
of precision because the data are fragmentary and too crude for this
purpose. However, particularly for manufacturing, we can infer the
probable direction of the impact for 1880—1919.
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To show the relationship between asset size and the capital-output
ratio, we use unpublished material, by Stanley S. Schor,'6 based on data
from the "Source Book" of Statistics of Income for 1947. Using these
data, we can compute ratios by major and minor industries by ten
asset-size classifications, separately for net-income and no-net-income
corporations. Our analysis is restricted to net-income corporations; in
1947, the vast majority of corporations in all industries was in this
category. To reduce the detail to manageable proportions, we work
with twenty-two major industry groups and with unweighted average
ratios for the following four size groups (in thousands of dollars):
under $100, $100 and under $1,000, $1,000 and under $10,000, $10,000
and over.
The evidence is unmistakable (Table 18). In 19 of the 22 industry
groups (the exceptions are food and kindred products, beverages, and
tobacco products), the ratio for the largest group is substantially higher
than the ratio for the smallest group. For all manufacturing industries,
the ratio for the largest corporations exceeds the ratio for the smallest
corporations by 126 per cent. In the three nonconforming industries,
inventories constitute a relatively important element in the total
capital structure. If, for these, the total capital-output ratio is used in.
place of the fixed capital-output ratio, the average ratio for the largest
corporations exceeds the average ratio for the smallest corporations.'7
In a very real sense, then, the capital-output ratio for all the major
industry groups tendsto increase with increasing assetsize.As
additional evidence we note that in 18 of the 22 industry groups the
highest ratios occurred in the largest corporations. In 13 groups the
lowest ratios were found in corporations with less than $100,000 of
assets; in 18 groups, in corporations with less than $1 million.
These empirical findings agree with a priori inferences. Scitovsky
argues that "the scope for using labor-saving machinery increases with
size; [that] large firms are likely to be in a better bargaining position
16 'The Capital-Product Ratio and Size of Establishment for Manufacturing
Industries" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1952). Schor computed
the ratio of fixed capital to gross sales. Gross sales closely approximates our defini-
tion of output. The following are the ten asset-size groups (in thousands of dollars)
for which ratios are calculated: Under $50, $50 and under $100, $100 and under
$250, $250 and under $500, $500 and under $1,000, $1,000 and under $5,000, $5,000
and under $10,000, $10,000 and under $50,000, $50,000 and under $100,000, and
$100,000 and over.
17 Total capital-output ratios by asset size (in thousands of dollars) are:
$100 and $1,000 and
Under under under $10,000
$100 $1,000 $10,000 andover
Food and kindred products 0.246 0.262 0.294 0.304
Liquor and beverages 0.446 0.498 0.463 0.489
Tobacco products 0.566 0.364 0.7 19 0.768
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TABLE 18
Fixed Capital-Output Ratios of Net Income Corporations, by Manufacturing
Industries: by Asset Size, 1947
(bo_sedonreported values)




$100 but $1,000 but
under under $10,000 and
$100 $1,000 $10,000 over
All manufacturing .098t .116 .154 .221*
Foodand kindred products .112* .111 .108 .lOlt
Liquors and beverages .228 .258* .204 .130t
Tobacco products .118 .066t .172* .077
Cotton textile products .076t .111 .139 .151*
Other textile mill products .098t .124 .162 .236*
Apparel .035 .028t .044 .090
Leather and leather products .047 .046 .066 .073*
Rubber products .133 .130 .180* .153
Lumber and basic timber pro-
ducts .Il7t .160 .310 .633*
Furnitureand finished wood
products .088t .116 .168 .180*
Pulp,paper, and products .096j .131 .224 .368*
Printing,publishing, andallied
industries .129t .169 .250 .456*
Petroleum refining .140 .l2lt .158 •4Ø5*
Chemicals and allied products .lO4t .122 .168 .286*
Stone, clay, and glass products .170t .225 .348 .366*
Iron and steel and their products .132 t .144 .160 .249*
Nonferrous metals and their
products .094t .105 .112 .286*
Electrical machinery and equip-
ment .077t .100 .114 .136*
Other machinery and equipment .160 .152 .l47t .203*
Motor vehicles, complete or parts.090t .092 .120 .156*
Other transportation equipment .130 .146 .121t .219*
Miscellaneous .090t .121 .168 .210*
*Highestratio.
tLowestratio.
Source:Stanley S. Schor, "The Capital-Product Ratio and Size of Establishment for
Manufacturing Industries," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania,
1952.
vis-a-vis the producers of equipment and therefore obtain the latter at
more favorable prices than do small firms; [and that] the factor limit-
ing size of small firms is usually their limited access to capital, whereas
the size of large firms is limited by various other considerations. Capital
theory suggests that this difference in the limit to size makes for the
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use of more capital-intensive methods of production in the large
firm."8
These reasons appear so cogent as to suggest that, throughout the
period analyzed in this paper, a rising capital-output ratio would have
been associated with increasing asset size of an enterprise. Unfortu-
nately, there are no reliable statistics by asset size over a long-term
period and, therefore, this generalization cannot be empirically tested.'9
It is possible, however, to compare the interindustry changes in the
capital-output ratio by asset size in 1937 and 1947 (Table 19). Once
again we draw on Schor's computations of ratios of fixed capital to
sales for net-income corporations by major industry groups and use the
four asset-size classes. In each year, we express the ratios of each of the
three larger classes as a percentage of the ratio of the smallest class.
The difference between the ratio of the smallest firms and of the
largest firms was appreciably reduced in 1947 compared with 1937.
This was true not only in aggregate manufacturing, but also in each
of the 15 industry groups.
Another way of expressing the change is to say that the fixed capital-
output ratio for large firms declined more rapidly between 1937 and
1947 than did, the ratio for small firms. This suggests that the more
capital per unit of output, the greater are the possibilities for capital-
saving innovations.20
If we knew the relationship between size of firm and the fixed
capital-output ratio and could measure the changes in thesize
18 Tibor Scitovsky,'Economic Theory and the Measurement of Concentration,"
Business Concengration and Price Policy, Special Conference Series, Universities—
National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton University Press,
1955, p. 111).
'9 Schor has analyzed the capital-output ratios for 1904 by size of establishment,
with size measured in terms of output. In 22 of 40 industries that Schor surveys, he
finds that the ratio of the smallest establishments is larger than the ratio for the
largest establishments. It is difficult to know how much weight to place on these
results for 1904. There are several reasons for skepticism. The computations are
based on no-net-income companies as well as net-income companies; and in a de-
pression year such as 1904, small companies may not have fared as well as the larger
companies. We have reason to believe that the number of establishments in many
of the larger size classes was small, and the ratios, therefore, may not be stableIt
seems likely, although proof is lacking, that in 1904 the practice of depreciation
accounting was largely restricted to the larger corporations. If this was true, it
would operate in the direction of a declining ratio with increasing size.
0 We find a similar relationship in Chapter V, where we discuss the change in
capital-output ratios by industries between 1919 and 1948. Some part of this larger
differential rate of decline in capital-output ratios among the larger firms may be
caused by the higher price level (for which no adjustment has been made) implicit
in the book value of assets in 1947. For example, because of the price rise, a firm
with assets of $100,000 in 1947 would be a smaller firm measured in 'real" capital
than a firm with $100,000 assets in 1937. And the smaller the firm is, the lower the
capital-output ratio.
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structure of manufacturing industries between 1880 and 1948, we
could evaluate the effect of a change in the size of a firm on over-all or
•industry ratios. Unfortunately, precise measures cannot be made with
the available data. However, the average size of establishment un-
doubtedly increased between 1880 and 1919. For example, the un-
TABLE 19
Fixed Capital-Output Ratios of Net Income Corporations, by Manufacturing
Industries: Largest Firms Compared to Smallest Firms, 1937 and 1947
(based on reported values)
Index of Fixed Capital-Output Ratio in Firms with
Assets ('000 omitted) of.—
$100 but $1,000 but $20,000
under $1,000 under $10,000 and over
19371947 19371947 19371947
(ratio in firmswith assets lessthan $100 thous. =100)
All manufacturing





Leather and leather products
Rubber products
Forest products
Paper, pulp, and products
Printing, publishing, and allied
industries
Petroleum refining
Chemicals and allied products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Metals and metal products except
motor vehicles
Motor vehicles, complete or parts
n.a. =notavailable.
Source: Same as Table 18.
162118 260157 360226
136 99 157 96 175 90
127113 149 90 n.a. 57
154 56 136146 201 65
249 127 455 160 n.a.214
165 80 535126 492257
159 98 274140 n.a.155
161 98 221 135 245115
181 137 415253 n.a.616
176136 406233 612383
147 131 187194 191354
101 86 222113 414289
167117 272 162 390275
152 132 310205 302215
153109 206113 418175
218102 260133 288173
weighted average capital (in 1929 prices) per establishment for a
sample of 34 industries comprising about two-thirds of all manu-
facturing was $94,000 in 1880, $415,000 in 1900, and $860,000 in 1919.21
On our assumption of a rising ratio with increasing size, the rising
25 To minimize the lack of comparability among censuses because of differences in
the total number of establishments covered, we adjust the number of establishments
in 1880 to eliminate custom and repair shops, and factory establishments with value
of product less than 500. By using an unweighted average, we eliminate the effect
on the average of the shifting relative importance of the individual industries.
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capital-output ratio that characterized these decades could be partly
explained on the statistical level by the trend toward larger establish-
ments. On the level of economic analysis, however, change in size
cannot be considered as an independent variable, for many of the
technological innovations of the period that caused a rising capital-
output ratio also resulted in larger establishments.
To judge by aggregative data, the size of structure changed little
between 1919 and 1929. The trend toward larger establishments re-
sumed between 1929 and 1937. The average number of wage earners
per establishment was 40.1 in 1919, 40.5 in 1929, and 51.4 in l937.
Thus, size structure was a neutral factor in the decline of the ratio
between 1919 and 1929. However, the decline between 1929 and 1937
occurred despite the indicated trend toward larger establishments. The
number of employees per establishment in 1937 and 1947 (58.7 and
59.3, respectively)23 suggests that the change in size structure between
those years was virtually nil. On this basis, we tentatively conclude that
the change in size was again a neutral factor in the continued decline
of the ratio between 1937 and 1948.
Summary of Findings
1. Up to 1919, an increasing fraction of a dollar of manufacturing
capital was used to produce a dollar of output; since 1919, a decreasing
fraction of a dollar of capital has been sufficient to produce a dollar of
output. These trends were observed whether the capital-output ratio
was based on reported or deflated values. This is consistent with the
interpretation that, in the earlier decades, capital innovations on
balance probably served more to replace other factor inputs than to
increase output. Since World War I, capital innovations serve more to
increase the efficiency of capital, hence to increase output, than to
replace other factor inputs.
2. Trend movements in the capital-output ratio were much the same
in mining as in manufacturing. The general configuration of the trend
movements is similar whether the ratios are based on reported values
or on values in 1929 prices. The ratio based on 1929 prices reached a
peak around 1919. It has continued downward through 1953, the final
year of our estimates.
3. A review of the data deficiencies does not disclose any weakness
of a magnitude that shakes our confidence in the validity of the trend
Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 27, 'The Structure
of Industry" (1941), p. 4.
23CensusofManufactures,1947,Volumes, Table 1. We use "all employees"
because of the shift from "wage earners" to "production workers" between 1937
and 1947.
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in the capital-output ratios, particularly when our interest is centered
on the broad pattern of movement.
4. This reversal in the direction of movement of the capital-output
ratio for manufacturing is found in all 39 branches, the number that
can be distinguished on a reasonably comparable basis over these
decades. In 31 branches, about four-fifths, the highest ratio occurred
before 1929, and in nearly half, the peak ratio was reached in 1919.
5. The changing importance of particular industries accounted for
about one-sixth of the total increase in the capital-output ratio for all
manufacturing between 1880 and 1919. Between 1919 and 1937, the
decline in the capital-output ratio occurred despite the changing
composition of industry. That is, if the only change was the change in
industry composition, the ratio would have risen by 7 per cent. The
inference is clear: whether in the period of rising or falling capital-
output ratio, the trend characterized most minor industry groups.
6. In mining also, if the only influence had been that of industry
shifts, the aggregate mining ratio would have increased continuously
during the whole period. Here, too, the actual increase in the aggregate
ratio between 1870 and 1919 was, in part, a result of the shifts in
industry weights. And the decline in this ratio since 1919 has taken
place despite these shifts.
7. According to the evidence of the "Source Book" of Statistics of
Income for 1947, the capital-output ratio in the major manufacturing
groups tends to increase with increasing asset size. The highest ratios,
for example, occurred in the largest corporations in 18 of the 22
industry groups. In 13 groups, the lowest ratios were found in corpora-
tions with less than $100,000 of assets; in 18 groups, in corporations
with less than $1 million. The trend toward larger establishments, in
the first decades of this period, would also help to explain the rising
capital-output ratio of those decades. However, change in size is not an
independent variable, for many of the technological innovations of the
period that caused a rising capital-output ratio also resulted in larger
establishments. Between 1919 and 1929 and between 1937 and 1948,
the size structure appears to have been a neutral factor in the decline
of the ratio. Between 1929 and 1937, the decline occurred despite the
indicated trend toward larger establishments.
66